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ABSTRACT 
DOES DEMOCRACY IMPACT THE LIVES OF THE POOR IN NICARAGUA? 
By 
Tanisha Shandie Brown Mitchel 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2010 
Does democracy help the poor? Nicaragua, the emphasis of this study, will be 
used to analyze the impact democracy might be having on improving the lives of the 
poor. The World Development Indicators (World Bank) and the Human Development 
Index (United Nations) from 1992 - 2006 will be used in this study to measure economic 
growth in Nicaragua. The Latin America Public Opinion Project data on Latin America 
measures Nicaragua public opinion regarding democracy and economic growth in the 
country. 
The graphs from the World Bank illustrate that the standard of living for the poor 
in Nicaragua is improving and that democracy has brought some economic growth. Still 
the data from the LAPOP surveys in two different time periods 1991 and 2008 show that 
the level of improvements does not indicate any drastic increase in growth of material 




Nicaragua has experienced a transition from dictatorship to democracy but 
remains one of the poorest countries in Central America. This raises an important 
question: Does democracy help the poor? Democracy has been used as the 
prescription for many of the political ills in third world nations. The question 
remains however, whether or not democracy is key to helping improve the lives of 
the poor in the world. Nicaragua, the main emphasis of this study, will be used to 
analyze the impact democracy might be having on improving the lives of the 
poor. 
Many scholars in the field have debated the issue, positing that democracy 
does promote growth while others argue that democracy has no effect on growth. 
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, they report that "it does not seem to be 
democracy or authoritarianism per se that makes the difference but something 
else. What that something else might be is far from clean'^Jonathan Hiskey 
provides added clarity, focusing on the dynamics of local politics, arguing that 
"the demand-based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a 
' Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic 
Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 441. 
1 
democratic local political environment."2 I will assess this debate in the case of 
Nicaragua. 
This study will use historical comparative analysis to analyze what impact 
democracy might have on the poor suited for this research because it focuses specifically 
on one country during a time period of political transition using several measures of 
economic indicators gathered within that time frame. The World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) and the Human Development Index (United Nations) from 1992 - 2006 
will be used in this study to measure economic growth in Nicaragua. The Latin America 
Public Opinion Project data on Latin America measures Nicaragua public opinion 
regarding democracy and economic growth in the country. Survey data from the same 
source (LAPOP) will be used to analyze the individual level of analysis of respondents' 
own assessments of their economic situation. 
2
 Jonathan Hiskey," Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico," Comparative 
Politics 1 ( October 2003): 56. 
2 
This research is particularly relevant to the world we live in today. In 
Nicaragua economic development and poverty reduction have historically been 
intertwined with political development at both macro and micro levels. Nicaragua 
remains a country where life for the majority is difficult and opportunity to substantially 
improve the standard of living among the majority of the population is limited. Today 
with the exception of Cuba, democracy has hit each corner of Latin America. Just like 
Nicaragua, many of these countries are still suffering from extreme poverty. Many 
Latinos are leaving their families and homes to migrate to the United States to escape the 
poverty that exists in their countries. Is democracy a possible solution to this real life 
epidemic, which is faced by the majority of the world's population? 
The questions asked in this study are: If a country becomes a democratic state 
will this bring economic growth? Does a stable democratic state guarantee its people a 
stable economy? The research facts presented here will try to provide answers to these 
questions using the situation of Nicaragua as a case study. 
This research proceeds in five chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by 
a second chapter that reviews the literature. The third chapter presents a historical 
overview of Nicaragua. The fourth chapter presents an analysis of Nicaragua's growth 




DOES DEMOCRACY HELP THE POOR? 
Table 1: Overview of Theoretical Arguments 
Democracy Helps 
• Doh Chull Shi argues, "Citizens of democratic 
states experience a far better quality of life than 
those in non-democracies." 
• David Brown and Wendy Hunter add, 
"Democratic regimes are associated with higher 
rates of social expenditures when faced with 
important economic constraints."4 
• Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia report, 
"Fewer children die in democracies than in 
dictatorships."5 
• Hiskey concludes, "The demand-based approach 
to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a 
democratic local political environment." 
Democracy Hurts 
• Michael Ross observes "democracies spend more 
money on education and health care than non-
democracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to 
middle and upper income groups." 
• Przeworski and Limongi suggest, "we do not know 
whether democracy fosters or hinders economic 
growth." 
• Helliwell adds regarding the effect of "democracy 
on subsequent economic growth, the evidence in 
this article pours cold water on the notion that 
introducing democracy is likely to accelerate 
subsequent growth."9 
• De Haan and Siermann suggest that, "the 
3
 Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory 
and Research," World Politics 1 ( October 1994): 156. 
4
 David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter Brown, " Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," The 
American Political Science Review 4 (December 1999): 779. 
5
 Thomas D. Zweifel and Patricio Navia, " Democracy, Dictartorship and Infant Mortality," Journal of 
Democracy 2( April 2000): 99. 
6
 Jonathan Hiskey, " Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico," 
Comparative Politics 1 ( October 2003): 56. 
7
 Michael Ross, " Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science 4 (October 
2006): 860. 
8
 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of 
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 440. 
4 
relationship between democracy and economic 
growth is not robust."10 
• Erich Weede concludes,"the overall effect of 
political democracy on economic growth is 
negative, but rather weak."11 
• Mitchell Seligson, "In Nicaragua, the study finds 
evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis 
of a link between corruption and erosion of belief 
in the legitimacy of the political system." 
We have scholars that have assessed the impact of a particular governing system 
on poverty arguing that regime type does matter and that democracy is better than most 
all systems at improving the lives of the poor. They argue that democracies allow more 
poor people to vote for redistributive policies. In addition democracies will invest in 
human capital and social services that will benefit the poor. 
Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia are among those who make the argument that 
regime type does have an impact on the economic growth of a nation. In their study, the 
authors used the infant mortality rate, a measure most frequently used by politicians and 
international groups. A total of 138 countries were selected and observed over a time 
frame from 1950-90. The data indicated that indeed, countries governed by a democratic 
system presented a significantly lower infant mortality rate than countries under 
9
 John F. Helliwell, " Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," British Journal of 
Political Science 2 (April 1994): 244. 
10
 Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siermann, " New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy 
and Economic Growth," Public Choice lA (January 1996): 193. 
11
 Enrich Weede, " The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National 
Analysis,"Kyklos 36 ( 1983): 35. 
12
 Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer 
2001) 227. 
5 
dictatorships. As the authors put it, "fewer children die in democracies than in 
dictatorships."13 
Zweifel and Navia noted "democracy outperformed dictatorship at every level of 
per-capita GNP. It is well known that per-capita income is inversely correlated with 
hunger: the higher a country's per-capita GNP, the lower the number of hungry people in 
that country."14 The authors argued that under a democratic regime there are more 
opportunities for the poor to improve their economic condition in comparison to a 
dictatorship. They 
democracies are likely to provide their citizens with a wider array of 
opportunities. Opportunity may take many forms, including access to education, freedom 
from absentee landlords, the absence of war, the provision of credits and income, the 
freedom to space birth, or simply a cow of one's own. Opportunity gives people greater 
power to shape their own destiny, enabling them to be more self-sufficient.1 
In support of this argument, Brown and Hunter focus on the impact of regime 
type by investigating the "relationship between democracy and the change in social 
spending controlling for GDP, debt, inflation, and age structure of the population through 
a time series of cross-sectional panels and with a data set for 17 Latin American countries 
from 1980 to 1992."16 The authors do note that in poor countries a democratic 






16David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter Brown, " Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America," The 
American Political Science Review 4 (December 1999): 779. 
6 
the poor. However, they also point out that "authoritarian regimes display greater 
sensitivity than their democratic counterparts to economic constraints. For example, when 
facing low levels of per-capita income and negative rates of growth, authoritarian 
governments reduce social spending at a faster rate than democracies."17 
Additionally, democracies are more prone to reduce social spending only when it 
might be beneficial for the poor, meaning they tend to make smarter choices that will 
improve the living standards of the poor, while authoritarian regimes reduce spending 
without analyzing the effects it might have on the poor.18 
The authors found that democratic regimes actually show higher rates of social 
spending even when encountered with major economic constraints. They argue that 
democratic regimes are the most beneficial form of government in third world nations 
suffering from extreme poverty since a democracy tends to offer its citizens better 
economic performance that does not include dramatic reduction in social spending, an 
action that would tend to affect the poorest segments of the population.19 In other words 
the author's findings suggest that a democratic government is the best suited for 
improving the lives of the poor because they invest more on social programs that more 
directly and quickly impact the poor. 
Adding to the Brown and Hunter argument is Doh Chull Shin, who notes, 






 Ibid., 789 
7 
democracies. Even in democracies, citizens of consistently democratic states were found 
to be 30 percent better-off than those of inconsistently democratic states."20 Shin 
emphasizes that nations transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule are not 
guaranteed instant economic growth.21 He explains that democracies, "merely create 
22 
more opportunities and better possibilities than existed before to become such a nation." 
Shin's explains that his main focus is "examining the conceptual and methodological 
issues of defining and measuring democratization along with the theoretical and strategic 
issues of explaining and promoting it."23 
He notes that new democracies might experience some difficulties adjusting to 
economic transformation and welfare; it would be very unlikely that present democracies 
would revert to authoritarian government because the international community has 
promoted and pressed for the influence of democracies.24 
Jonathan Hiskey adds to this argument examining local political regimes and the 
impact these smaller units have on development programs designed to give the poor 
Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory 





23Doh Chull Shin, " On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory 
and Research," World Politics 1 (October 1994): 137. 
24
 Ibid., 170. 
8 
opportunities to participate in projects likely to benefit their communities. Hiskey 
examined Mexico as a case study since it is considered a great example of the "centralist 
tradition" that has dominated political organizations in Latin America. The author 
analyzed results of the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) that was the most 
prominent development strategy pursued by developing nations during the 1990's. The 
objective of PRONASOL was to allow local governments and members of the 
community to participate in decision-making about major projects affecting their 
communities. The program expected strong participation and representation from each 
community participating in a project. The success of each project was measured by the 
accountability and level of participation from each member of the community in order 
to test the connection between local politics and the development impact of PRONASOL, 
237 municipalities in the Mexican states of Jalisco and Michoacan are analyzed. The 
author found that a "demand -based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by 
a democratic local political environment." The author offers a plausible explanation 
suggesting that communities, municipalities and local government in developing nations 
should require substantial citizens' participation since the likely result would be, that 
though corruption cannot completely be erased, it would be more balanced. The types of 
participation expected, as Hiskey describes them, are the "basic freedoms of assembly, 
25
 Jonathan Hiskey, " Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Enviroment in Mexico," 




 Ibid., 41. 
9 
association, participation, and political voice, critical in programs that call for citizens to 
organize and submit proposals to program officials, work in concert with municipal 
officials to prioritize and implement projects, and hold both government and program 
officials accountable for the outcome of projects."28 It is logical that democracy would 
reduce poverty at a local level if local governments and members of each community are 
active participants in the outcome of each project and, since such participation is a 
hallmark of democratic action. Levels of corruption that exist in these local governments 
may be more likely to decrease. 
Hiskey argues that "increasing citizen voice and the public accountability 
through both participation and better governance can lead to greater efficacy in 
government action."29 Public participation is the best way to accomplish accountability 
from government officials by demanding and interacting in activities and policies that 
indirectly and directly affect the people. This type of citizen's involvement can even have 
a stronger effect at the sub-national level, meaning that within development projects that 
have strong citizen's participation, there is more likely to be promotion of an accountable 
and effective municipal government that will reduce poverty. 
On the other side of the argument, we have scholars that argue that regime type 
does not impact growth. For one thing, democracies have uneven economic records that 




author uses data on infant and child mortality rates to strengthen his skepticism about any 
positive impact democracy has had on the poorest segment of a population. His main 
argument has been that "democracies spend more money on education and health care 
than non-democracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper income 
groups."31 Ross argues, 
There is good evidence that democracies fund public services at a higher level 
than nondemocracies. But it is not obvious that these infusions of money actually reach 
the poor; nor is it obvious that they produce better social outcomes, such as longer, 
healthier, or more productive lives. If democracies produce better outcomes for low-
income families, then countries that transition from autocratic to democratic rule should 
see improvements in their infant and child mortality rates.32 
He suggests that the reason why we view democracy as a good thing for the poor 
is due to the fact that " cross- national studies tend to exclude from their samples non-
democratic states that have performed well; this leads to the mistaken inference that non-
democracies have worse records than democracies."33 
Ross found a small but not significant amount of evidence that democracies play a 
part in the reduction of infant and child mortality rates. He says, conclusively, that 
democracy does not offer any economic benefits for the poor. Democracy does provide 
political rights and liberties but for the poor these political rights and liberties probably 
31
 Michael Ross, " Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science 4 (October 
2006): 860. 
11 
have little if any effect on their standard of living. Ross' argument is that the poor have 
very little influence in any decision-making that might affect their well being under any 
political regime. 
Do political regimes have any impact on economic growth? In a seminal work, 
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, review the literature and point out that 
previous research has credited regime type with growth without trying to logically 
attribute the specific factors that have impacted economic growth. They report there is 
substantial evidence to support the argument that politics does influence growth, and they 
demonstrate that the differences between democracies and dictatorships are not 
consistent.35 The authors argue that one regime type, democratic or authoritarian, does 
not prove to be more effective than the other. 
The authors note the example of the disadvantage presented in the examination 
of regime types related to economic well -being when, 
in averaging the rates of growth often South American countries between 1946 
and 1988, one discovers that authoritarian regimes grew at the average rate of 2.15 
percent per annum while democratic regimes grew at 1.31 percent. Hence, one is inclined 
to conclude that authoritarianism is better for growth than democracy. But suppose in fact 
regimes have no effect on growth."36 The authors found that by changing their selections 
and generating "unbiased means for the two regimes' these, not surprisingly, reproduced 




Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of 
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 435. 
36
 Ibid., 439. 
12 
The authors argue that they have no answer to whether or not democracy 
generates or limits economic growth. What is clear, they assert, is that "it does not seem 
to be democracy or authoritarianism per se that makes the difference but something else. 
What that something else might be is far from clear." 
Democracy tends to be associated with economic growth despite the fact that we 
continue to witness strong levels of poverty and inequality in democratic nations such as 
Nicaragua. Przeworski and Limongi's research suggest that there is no empirical 
evidence that links democracy or, per se, any type of regime with economic growth. The 
authors admit that since neither democracy nor authoritarianism seems to influence 
growth the answer may come with more research. What influences growth if it is not 
regime type? 
Mitchel Seligson argues that the reason why democracy is not successful in third 
world countries like Nicaragua is due to corruption, weakening the impact of democracy 
on growth. This suggests that if levels of corruption are high in Nicaragua citizens might 
be able to vote while politicians and other members of the government are using funds 
destined for anti-poverty programs for their benefits. Seligson says, in "Nicaragua, the 
study finds evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis of a link between 
corruption and erosion of belief in the legitimacy of the political system."39 He argues 
38
 Ibid., 441. 
39
 Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer 
2001) 227. 
13 
that democracy is not going to be effective if citizens have no trust in a political system 
that fails to promote economic development and improvements in their lives. 
In order to analyze the impact corruption is having on democracy Seligson used 
two survey studies, the first one completed in 1996 and the second in 1998 the 
anticorruption campaign main objective fight against corruption. The purpose of the 
campaign was to assess how Nicaraguan's felt about the corruption in Nicaragua, to test 
how to go about creating a solution to the problem and how to encourage Nicaraguans 
greater confidence in the political system. 
The campaign was put into practice by a Nicaraguan nongovernmental 
organization, Grupo Fundemos. The goal was to inform Nicaraguans "about a major 
financial management reform initiative being implemented by the government, with 
technical and financial support from the international donor community (USAID, the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank)"41 with the objective of 
reducing the levels of corruption in Nicaragua. 
The campaign worked directly with the people by using the media and other 
advertisement sources to bring awareness and participation in the project among the 
Nicaraguan public. The campaign proved to be a powerful tool in fighting corruption. 
The author found that "the public awareness campaign not only increased citizen's ability 
40
 Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer 
2001) 222. 
41
 Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer 
2001)226. 
14 
to define transparency, it also has a direct impact on their awareness of Nicaragua's 
several financial management and anticorruption institutions."42 
In countries like Nicaragua corruption levels are high and politicians frequently 
exploit funds destined to improve the lives of its citizens. This leaves no place for trust in 
either democracy or the government system. For these reasons, anticorruption campaigns 
are crucial in promoting transparency in the government system and public support and 
participation are vital for its success. 
Helliwell's contributes to this effort by evaluating the linkages between 
democracy and economic growth. In his study the author used cross sectional and pooled 
data from a total of 125 countries during the time frame from 1960 to 1985.43 The author 
selected 125 countries, the largest number of countries that could be used, for the purpose 
of getting a strong selection of per capita real incomes. He also incorporates political and 
civil liberties to further analyze the impact these might have during the growth of a 
nation. To determine the impact that democracy has on economic growth the study was 
reduced to a smaller selection of ninety-eight countries to factor for the time periods of 
the 1960 to 1985. Education is also included, since education is considered to be a 
principal part of growth in democracies. The growth performance of 1960-85 eras 




 John F. Helliwell, " Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth," British Journal of 
Political Science 2 (April 1994): 225. 
15 
and physical capital." By mixing democracy with political freedoms the author is able 
to analyze what impact the political system has on the overall growth of a nation. 45 
Helliwel found that countries with population consisting of higher income levels 
tend to have democratic forms of government. Still this result does not indicate a 
complete positive effect of democracy on economic growth. "It has been shown that this 
positive effect does not appear to be the result of reverse causation: estimates of the 
reverse effect of democracy on subsequent growth indicate that this feedback is more 
likely to be negative than positive." To add, countries with lower growth rates or per 
capita income initially start off with a higher growth rate, slowly decreasing as income 
data is combined with richer countries. The author argues that a possible explanation to 
this decrease is that countries adapt to their new democratic governments during the 
initial stage of development. The author continues by arguing that certain parts of a 
democratic system can be more productive in promoting growth than others. He also 
points out that other factors such as culture that were not factored in this study can 
influence the connection between democracy and growth. Despite this argument it is 
"still unclear whether the adaptation of a democratic government contributes to growth 










is also unclear how certain aspects of democratic governments might contribute to or 
decrease the possibilities for economic growth. 
The author concludes that there is a positive effect between per capita income and 
the process of assimilation to democracy and he interprets this to mean that democracies 
are a preferable choice of government as countries become more industrialized and 
citizens become educated. Helliwel also discusses how the results in this study also prove 
it is unlikely that democracy can increase growth. Instead, the statistical modification 
considered in this study leads to a negative direct result of democracy on growth.49 He 
argues that this negative response was statistically low and insignificant and it was 
counterbalanced by the indirect positive results of investment and education. The author 
thus argues that democracy has a greater influence through education and investment than 
on overall economic growth. This strengthens the argument that democracy does not 
directly influence economic growth but instead, institutions that influence democracies 
might promote and accelerate growth. 
In contradiction to Helliwell's argument, De Haan and Siermann also examine 
the relationship between democracy and economic growth. The authors argue that the 
connection between democracy and economic growth is not robust and democratic 
freedoms are not positively connected to growth. Initially, uncensored media and open 




development. It "can also be said that political and civil freedoms make it harder for 
government or the private sector to make tough but necessary decisions."50 
The authors disagree with previous studies suggesting that democratic freedoms 
have an impact on growth. They attribute this to the use of Gastil's ranking survey 
publications despite the fact that the survey offers a consistent time series available only 
from 1973 onwards. The growth period that is considered to be the most efficient starts in 
the 1960s. "Given a likely positive relationship between income levels and democracy, 
using a measure of democracy in the middle or the end of the sample period runs the risk 
that a possible effect of democracy on growth is masked by the reserve effect of income 
level on democracy."51 Another downfall is that the Gastil's ranking does not take into 
account that the democratic qualities of a country can vary over time. Thus, just focusing 
on the Gastil ranking might lead to biased results. 
De Haan and Siermann's study adds to previous research from many angles by 
introducing a variety of measures of democracy that cover longer periods of time than the 
Gastil rankings. They add a measure that takes into account the length of time that a 
country can be considered a democracy. Regime types are also analyzed and included in 
their study. The examinations of Learner (1983) and Levine and Rene It (1992) bound 
Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siermann, " New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy 
and Economic Growth," Public Choice lA (January 1996): 175. 
51
 Ibid., 176. 
18 
analysis are included in the study to strengthen the authors' findings. De Haan and 
Siermann suggest that democracy comes at a costly price in relation to improving living 
standards. The authors argue that recent studies on economic growth have argued that 
"lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth." 
They continue by adding that in both Learner (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992), 
analysis was used to help determine the connection between regime type and economic 
growth. The authors found that the connection between democracy and economic growth 
is not significant. Despite, the likeliness of a connection between these variables is still 
not significant. Despite, the likeliness of a connection between these variables is still not 
significant. Added, this is sufficient for the coefficient to become irrelevant.55 The main 
argument the authors put forward is that the relationship between democracy and growth 
is not significantly strong and democratic freedoms do not have positive influence on 
growth. 
Erich Weede examines the impact of democracy on economic growth by using a 
cross national and cross- sectional multiple regression examination with data collected 
from 1960s and 1970s.56 The author uses two-indicators, the GNPC Gross National 
Product and the GDP Gross Domestic Product, to determine the impact of democracy on 
53
 Ibid., 177. 
54
 Ibid., 192. 
55Ibid., 193. 
56
 Enrich Weede, " The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National 
Analysis,"Kyklos 36 ( 1983): 24. 
19 
economic growth. Weede's data has led many researchers to argue that democracy can 
provide economic growth; especially as measured in third world nations suffering 
extreme poverty.57 
Weede argues that, "while democracy might affect growth rates, growth rates are 
unlikely to affect democratic performance at least not in the short run.... The overall 
effect of political democracy on economic growth is negative, but rather weak." He 
adds that in countries where the state manages most of the economy regardless if is more 
or less developed, political democracy becomes an obstacle for economic growth.59 He 
emphasizes that especially in less developed nations the possible negative effect of 
democracy on growth is insignificant. If we want to ignore the differences that these two 
variables, democracy and growth, offer, "we should rather limit government interference 
in or (mis) management of, the economy."60 The author's findings suggest that 
democracy has a negative impact on growth by examining both GNPC and GPD income 
levels that measure the growth levels of a nation. Democracy has no linkage with 
economic growth. This leads one to say that the spread of democracy in Nicaragua will 
not improve the lives of the poor and what other factors might positively influence 







Clearly then, Scholars do disagree on the relationship between democracy and 
poverty. Democracy can either hurt or improve the living standard of the poor. Ross 
argues that democracy does not benefit the poor because it feeds more power to the 
middle class than those in the lower class. To strengthen this argument Przeworski and 
Limongi suggest, "we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic 
growth."61 The authors concluded with "it does not seem to be democracy or 
authoritarianism per se that makes a difference, but something else."62 Seligson adds that 
"in Nicaragua, the study finds evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis of a link 
between corruption and erosion of belief in the legitimacy of the political system."63 
Helliwell adds that in examining the effect of "democracy on subsequent economic 
growth, the evidence in this article pours cold water on the notion that introducing 
democracy is likely to accelerate subsequent growth."64 The findings of De Haan and 
Siermann suggest that, "the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not 
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of 
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 440. 
62Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi /'Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of 
Economic Perspective 3( Summer 1993): 441. 
63
 Mitchel A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization What is to be done? Public Integrity (Summer 
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robust." And Weede concludes his study arguing that, "the overall effect of political 
democracy on economic growth is negative, but rather weak."66 
Opposing these arguments are scholars who posit that democracy does help 
improve the living standard of the poor. Doh Chull Shi argues, "citizens of democratic 
states experience a far better quality of life than those in non-democracies."67 Brown 
and Hunter add, "democratic regimes are associated with higher rates of social 
expenditures when faced with important economic constraints."68 Zweifel and Navia 
report, "fewer children die in democracies than in dictatorships."69 Hiskey concludes, 
"The demand-based approach to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a democratic 
local political environment."70 To add to this debate, my study tests these theories in 
Nicaragua. Each author as discussed above was able to offer a plausible explanation as 
to why democracy helps or hurt the poor. These findings are useful in analyzing the 
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impact democracy has on the living standard of the poor in Nicaragua and what a nation 





Anastasio Somoza (1936-1957) Beginning to End of the Dynasty: 
Nicaraguan political history is checkered with the interests of the Spanish, British 
and United States military and political intervention in the country. Nicaraguan history is 
also filled with evidence of conflicts of interest among those who fought to govern the 
country. As Humberto Belli has pointed out, 
The formation of a national state, based on impersonal and rational bureaucracies and 
laws, was all but impossible. Instead, political conflicts and agreements boiled down to 
arrangements between individuals and thereby favored those that involved blood relations or 
friendship. The poor-those campesinos, peons, and artisans who made up the mass of the political 
factions and the private armies came under the control of diverse local oligarchies whose 
protection and favor they sought, thereby strengthening patron-client relationships.7I 
The growth of coffee production in Nicaragua divided the country into two major 
political groups in which each had respective locations, the liberals in Leon City located 
about 100 km northeast of the capital Managua and the conservatives in Granada which 
sets on the western shore of Lago de Nicaragua, some 45km southeast of Managua.72 The 
coffee growers, and their respective caudillos, represented the oligarchy that controlled 
the Nicaraguan political system, 
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From 1858 until 1893, leaders of the Granada faction occupied the presidency of the 
republic, but Liberals from Leon were included in the cabinet and in the National Congress. 
During these years, political peace and a growing demand on the world market for coffee set the 
basis for Nicaragua's modern export economy.73 
However, the power struggle between liberals and conservatives and the new 
coffee growers created new political conflicts in the early nineteen-century. While this 
took place, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who came from a family of wealthy coffee 
planters, was able to rise as the head of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Somoza 
occupied himself with the pursuit of his own political goals to become the new president 
in the 1936 election. Somoza did not waste any time trying to accomplish his goal, 
especially knowing that the current president Juan Bautista Sacasa's objective was to 
prevent him from becoming the new president. 
Somoza immediately began organizing his campaign in local communities and 
by November of 1934, he had organized a group of "somozistas." These somozista 
groups assured Somoza their vote and the promotion of his candidacy. Despite the fact 
that Sacasa's administration had prohibited any political campaigning until eight months 
before the election, these Somozista supporters continued there campaigning in secret.74 
Somoza was the head of the Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia Nacional) and 
they themselves played a crucial role in promoting his candidacy. The Guardia officers 
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were involved in promoting and advertising his campaign; they organized events, gave 
speeches and collected funds from Somoza sympathizers and personal friends.75 During 
his campaign, Somoza presented a new image to the Nicaraguan people different from 
the traditional leaders. His focus during his campaign was to separate himself from 
politics and to assure the populace that he did not fall under the traditional political 
system of corruption and failed promises that had ruled Nicaragua.76Somoza did not 
possess the skills required to be president of Nicaragua but his position as head of the 
National Guard gave him the opportunity to promote himself into that position. Somoza, 
"was limited in administrative experience, Somoza's major talents were his personal 
charm and his ability to extricate himself from scrapes with the law." 77 
Somoza was able to gain control and become the president of Nicaragua in the 1936 
election due to several factors affecting the country's stability and growth. Nicaragua was 
going through a Great Depression with the collapse of coffee prices, and decades of 
constant interference in Nicaraguan affairs by the United States. Nicaraguan politicians 
had been unable to solve the problems the country faced. The National Guard, a national 
police force, was generally needed for its power to control the domestic situation. 
Somoza took advantage of his position and thus became the president of Nicaragua. Once 
elected, the National Guard was the main foundation of Somoza's political administration 
75
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for the next twenty years, after the elimination of the previous president Juan Bautista 
Sacasa. With the guard and the Liberal party volunteers in Leon on his side, there was no 
question that Somoza had successfully taken control of the Nicaragua.78 
Somoza used the National Guard to pursue his own personal and political 
interests. The Guard dominated all institutions and forms of government in Nicaragua, 
controlling, 
A broad range of public functions. It operated the national radio and telegraph 
networks, the postal service, and the immigration service. It controlled customs, taking 
special interest in the important arms, munitions, and explosives. It conducted all police 
functions and controlled the National Health Services. The guard collected taxes and 
operated the railways."79 
Somoza was clever and quick in making sure that he remained in power. There 
were attempts to destroy him but he managed to stay in power due to his corrupt and 
efficient system. The question is, how was he able to stay in power for next twenty years 
building his empire, clearly a dictatorship, in which he dominated the country through his 
military power? In fact the United States was interfering in Nicaragua's politics by 
supporting Somoza's dictatorship. During the years of Somoza rule, Nicaraguan political 
institutions were filled with corruption, violence, torture and repression with the National 
Guard involved to full extent. Nicaragua's political system had been clearly linked to 
family ties and personal interest from both international and internal players, who 
founded an undemocratic government as a tool to interfere with or to gain power. 





strengthen his control of the National Guard on which he relied to control the Nicaraguan 
society. Somoza "wheedled from Roosevelt help to reestablish the Guard military 
Academy, to organize a navy, and to build a highway to Rama in the Atlantic zone, a 
major infrastructure project."80 
The Nicaraguan economy suffered tremendously during Somoza rule. Small farmers 
lost their land to the large wealthy landowners. The upper class slowly was taking away 
every source of wealth the poor possessed. They owned vast amounts of land and to 
subsist, the poor remained to cultivate land they did not control, but which they needed in 
order to survive. The gap between the upper class and the lower class intensified and 
grew stronger during the years Somoza ruled. Somoza's personal wealth grew as well. 
"By 1944 he owned fifty-one cattle ranches, and his forty-six coffee plantations made 
him the largest coffee producer in Nicaragua."82 He exploited his power to every extent 
and took advantage of the country's weak financial institutions, making wealth accessible 
to his representatives, family members and those who supported his administration by 
giving loans out by preference.83 
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The major economic setbacks Nicaragua suffered occurred during Somoza 
period were the 1930's great depression and World War II. These two major events 
affected the Nicaraguan economy severely; with the coffee, sugar and banana production 
declining drastically. All these commodities coffee, sugar and bananas were main 
sources of wealth for the Nicaraguan economy during Somoza's government. During his 
regime, the goal for every wealthy landowner was to gain more land. This affected 
tremendously the ability to develop a middle class in Nicaragua society. The majority of 
Nicaragua's labor force cultivated these export products for Nicaragua. Labor unions and 
organizations were demanding new labor reforms; there was constant conflict and protest 
against a lack of labor rights and Somoza, at some point, tried to deal with the problem 
by making false promises.84 Once he gained support of the major labor groups, "he 
dismantled the new labor reforms, took over and corrupted union leadership, violently 
O f 
purged the former union leaders, and forced many unionists and socialists into exile." 
By mid-twentieth century, five factors had caused great new concentration of capital 
in Nicaragua: 1) the greatly increased land concentration in the coffee and cotton 
industries; 2) the coffee and cotton price increases (and the cotton cultivation boom) 
beginning in the late 1940's; 
3) the expanded ties of Nicaraguan capitalists to U.S. banks and investors; 4) the 
political peace purchased by Somoza through permitting Conservative factions 






Somoza's oppressive regime provoked his own death by the hands of Rigoberto 
Lopez a twenty-seven years old poet and print shop worker who had just returned from El 
Salvador where he had spent five years preparing for the anti-Somoza attack. Somoza 
died on September 29, 1956 leaving behind his two sons, Luis and Anastasio, both of 
whom immediately took control. 
The Somoza brothers were trained to replace their father's position. Once he died 
they immediately continued his oppressive system. Despite attempts by the Nicaraguan 
people to bring an end to the Somoza's family authoritarianism, their power and control 
had grown to great extent. During the Somoza Garcia autocracy the United States 
provided all sorts of support and once the Somoza brothers took charge this support 
continued. The United States supplied the Somoza brothers with economic aid and 
military support that strengthened their government and enriched the brothers. All types 
of U.S financial assistance poured into Nicaragua from 1953 through 1975 amounting to 
about 17.3 million. This support discouraged the Nicaraguan people from fighting against 
the Somoza brothers who became the strongest and most powerful force in Nicaragua. 
The economic situation in Nicaragua under Luis and Anastacio did not improve. 
In 1972 a major earthquake devastated Managua, disrupting the stability of Nicaragua. 
The constant revolt and violence against the government scared investors away and with 




with the government and were ready for change. The poverty in Nicaragua had continued 
to spread in "part because the government repressed unions, kept wages low, and 
undertook no effective agrarian reform. Thus Nicaragua's internal market remained 
small, and most manufactured goods were exported. New industries had to import much 
SO 
of the raw materials used, increasing external dependencies." With few jobs being 
created for the lower class to survive off, the poor were frightened and ready to make a 
difference. This constant economic recession the country was facing, while the Somoza 
family and other upper class groups continued to benefit the profits, provoked a 
revolution that strengthened the Sandinista Movement. That movement had started before 
Somoza became president but had intensified over the years with all the injustice of 
human rights violations, brutality and humiliations the Nicaraguan people had 
experienced from the hands of the Somoza's brothers and father. 
Many of those who actively opposed the regime felt Somoza's cruel hand; most 
of Nicaragua's current revolutionary leaders spent time in jail or suffered torture. But 
Somoza's repression backfired. It undoubtedly cowed and destroyed some opponents, but 
it increased the resolved and the numbers of others. Between this and the growing 
economic frustrations of the lower strata, even a committed and institutionally strong 
regime would have faced serious challenges. But forty years of Somocismo had swelled 
and corrupted the state, spoiled and divided the upper class, and perverted the instruments 
of security.90 
Sandino and the vision of the Revolution: 
The idea behind the Sandinista revolution was to pursue the goals of the legendary 
Augusto Cesar Sandino, a nationalist and liberal who wanted to liberate and free 
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Nicaragua from any external power and make Nicaragua for Nicaraguans. Sandino 
incorporated nationalist, socialist and communist thought in forming his revolutionary 
ideas. The Mexican Revolution inspired most of his ideology. The principle was to 
fight until death against imperialism and those who oppress others and enriched 
themselves off the hard labor of the poor. ! His vision was to free Nicaragua from 
the Somoza regime. Somoza murdered him before he was able to accomplish this 
goal. The Sandinistas used Sandino's ideology to capture the Nicaraguan revolution 
and to continue the fight against the Somoza regime and later, the United States, 
during the Contra War. The (FSLN) Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National 
continued the vision of the legendary Sandino, absorbing new influences from the 
new Marxism ideology that inspired the Cuban Revolution with leaders such as Fidel 
Castro and Che Guevara.92 
Sandinismo took its first stand with the support of Carlos Fonseca Amador and Col 
Alberto Bayo, who had a great impact during both the Cuban Revolution and the 
Nicaraguan Revolutions. Carlos Fonseca Amador was the first to recover "Sandino 
political thought." Even though Bayo did not help in recovering Sandino political 
thought, he dedicated himself to making sure that Sandino's vision for Nicaragua was 
not lost or forgotten but would be continued as a mission for Nicaragua. He collected 
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Sandino political thoughts recovered by Fonseca and created a guerrilla manual that 
contained an oral and written legacy of Sandino's vision for the revolution. Sandinismo 
was a movement against the dictatorship of the Somoza family and the fight to establish 
democracy in Nicaragua. 
Revolutionaries such as Col. Bayo, Carlos Fonseca, Che Guevara and Fidel 
Castro wanted to capture the work of Sandino. Strategies such as Bayo's were created 
to capture the vision of the legendary Nicaraguan Hero who fought for freedom and 
justice. As argued by the author Donald Hodges, "Nicaragua was the first country in 
which the written and unwritten legacies of a great folk hero and national redeemer 
became impregnated with the new Marxism, the first instance of the confluence of two 
different generations of revolutionaries: the surviving veterans of Sandino's army and 
the new Marxists of the FSLN."94 
Sandinista Construction of Democracy in Nicaragua 
Jonas and Stein give the Sandinista Revolution credit for the construction of 
democracy since 1979. "Nicaragua politics have been shaped first and foremost by the 
nation's history and by particular constellations, or alliances, of class forces emerging 
from that history to make the revolution."95 Jonas and Stein establish instances in which 
the Sandinistas have "attempted to build pluralism into the structure of the revolution as 
seen particularly in the 1984 elections, the 1986 Constitutional process, and the ongoing 
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institutionalizing and political openings since the signing of 1987 Central America Peace 
Accords." % 
The victory of the revolution in 1979 against Somoza brought the political 
coalition, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (FSLN) to power. The main 
objectives of the Sandinistas were political pluralism through popular participation and 
the creation of a mixed economy. The ideology of the "Nicaraguan Revolution is a blend 
of Sandinismo (with its tradition of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and cross-class unity) 
Marxism, and Liberation Theology."97 The Sandinistas focused on the needs of the 
majority of the population. The impetus for the popular participation in politics was 
promoted through mass organizations in which the people were encouraged to express 
their support for programs and voice their opinions on issues affecting the country. The 
United States under the Carter administration was supportive and provided aid in 1979. 
Reagan changed course in 1980, viewing the Sandinista ideology as a threat. 
The Reagan administration, with support from the U.S State Department, rewrote 
what they called the early years of the Nicaraguan Revolution using quotes from a 
September 1979 Sandinista document, which they renamed "The Seventy Two Hour 
Document" and which they considered a "communist blue print." The objective was to 




mixed economy." Instead they claimed the September, 1979 document was just a scam to 
cover their real plans in turning Nicaragua into a communist state.98 
The Reagan administration believed that the Sandinista government's intention 
was to create a one-party communist state and Reagan launched a war, despite the fact 
that the U.S Congress opposed this idea. In Reagan's covert "Contra War" the United 
States claimed that the freedom fighters were the contras, and the Sandinistas were 
labeled as communists. Thus, the first attempts by the Sandinistas to practice democracy 
failed to a great extent due to the United States intervention. The Sandinista government 
promised to hold an election by 1984 as another way to prove the strength and purpose of 
the revolution. The Sandinistas sent out "delegations around the world to study other 
country's electoral laws. The government took the first step in institutionalizing the rights 
of opposing parties, rather than leaving them to depend on the Sandinista good will, by 
negotiating with them the law of political parties."99 This marked a start towards 
democracy in the history of Nicaragua in which opposite political parties were granted 
the right to compete and had great support from the government.100 Despite this support 
the opposition parties were disgruntled too. 
Immediately with news of the 1984 elections results, the United States claimed that 
the Nicaraguan election was invalid, with secretary of State Richard Shultz calling the 
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voting a " Soviet Style Sham." The claim was among the first open signs of activities in 
the U.S itself that helped undermine the revolution. The Reagan Administration 
continued to insist that Nicaragua did not have an elected government to run for 
elections.101 Furthermore, the United States forced candidate Arturo Cruz of the 
Coordinadora Democratica (CD) and Virgilio Godoy of the Partido Liberal 
Institucionalista (PLI) to back out of the elections. The Reagan administration's main 
ambition was to dishonor the Sandinista government instead of allowing Cruz to take part 
in the election and respect the results from the vote of the Nicaraguan people. Overall the 
United States government wanted to prove that there was no "freedom of elections in 
Nicaragua."102 
As part of the process of building Nicaragua as a democratic state, the Sandinistas 
began writing and preparing to ratify a constitution. Following the 1984 election, the 
development process for the Nicaraguan constitution was based on the participation of 
both the Nicaraguan public and the political parties. The National Constituent Assembly 
election in 1984 chose a Constitutional Commission formed by twelve members of the 
FSLN or Sandinistas and ten others from different parties. The FSLN made sure it 
occupied fewer seats in order to allow the participation of other parties,103 Writing of the 
first draft of the Constitution took place between August and October of 1985, with the 
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participation of "twenty four political parties, religious groups, labor and professional 
unions and other organizations." The commission held meetings and discussion in order 
to integrate many views. Copies of the constitution were handed out all over the country 
to facilitate access to the Nicaraguan public allowing them voice and participation in the 
issues the constitution addressed. 104 
Even though the Sandinistas promoted the formation of a strong democracy in 
Nicaragua, once elected they had problems with political rights and civil liberties. The 
fall of the Somoza Dynasty had marked the victory of the Sandinista Revolution and a 
new start for the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinistas had won a victory towards 
democracy but they had also inherited intense amounts of debt from the Somoza dynasty 
that made their goals more challenging. The new government was faced with, an 
Average deficit of 355 million dollars per year, and government deficits increased from 37 
percent of the 300 million 1975 budget to 51 percent of the 439-million 1978 budget. Of the 1.44-
billion total public expenditures from 1975 to 1978, Nicaragua had financed 31 percent (459 
million) through foreign borrowing. The new government came to power with the foreign 
accounts of the treasury drawn down to zero and with an international public debt of 1.6 
billion.105 
The main goal for the Sandinista government once it came to power was to better 
the living conditions of the majority of poor people and redistribute the wealth that was 
concentrated in the hands of the Somoza family and a few aristocrat groups in Nicaragua. 
The main focus was to make Nicaragua progress economically, socially and 
democratically as a nation. In 1977, the most underprivileged of the Nicaraguan 
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population was barely surviving off 15 percent of the national income. By 1979 to 1980 
there was an increase in unemployment making it more difficult for the poor to survive. 
Despite these obstacles, by mid 1980's inequalities were slowly decreasing.106 One of the 
objectives of the Sandinista government was to boost industrial and agricultural 
production as well as public sector construction in order to create more jobs. This goal 
did succeed for the first two years until 1981 at which time107"land distribution and 
increases in the size of the armed forces took up much of the slack in employment so that 
unemployment did not rise precipitously, remaining at 14 percent."108 Another main 
concern for the Sandinista's government was "to raise real wages for the poor without 
promoting inflation, and this aim led to caution in raising real wages."109 This to some 
extent was successful in agriculture, since the land redistribution led to rise in the 
production of goods and an increase in the earnings of a vast amount of peasants. The 
state farm workers were able to acquire garden plots. This to some degree kept inflation 
moderate despite the fact that the anti-inflation effort caused aggravation among workers 
and unions. In spite of the attempts to moderate wages and prevent inflation, "food price 
subsidies somewhat placated workers' concerns about wages, but subsidies reduction in 
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wages more than 35 percent between 1981 and 1983."110 Additionally, the government 
tried creating what it described as the "social salary," which consisted of a range of 
public services intended to better the lives of the poor in Nicaragua.111 
Best remembered were the literacy campaign and the fourfold increase in 
spending for education, which was interrupted by the war, and thus its lasting effects 
were very severely undermined. Though primary school education for the majority poor 
has continued over the past three decades, communities continue to struggle to maintain 
educational quality and high levels of enrollment. Literacy rates, measured after the 
1980-1981 literacy crusade, remain substantial in spite of the varying quality of education 
services between rural and city poor. Social Security payments and consistently more just 
wage levels do continue into the 21 century and strong neighborhood organization efforts 
continue as well, especially in communities where persons with strong leadership skills 
which were developed through trainings in the 1980's, remain active. All in all, during 
the half- decade following "The Triumph" of 1979 and before the Contra War consumed 
the attention and efforts of substantial numbers of citizens and citizen-leaders, the list of 
public services intended and delivered to better the lives of the poor in Nicaragua 
included: construction of parks and recreation facilities in rural and poor city 
neighborhoods; handicap rehabilitation; services for orphans and delinquent teens; 
neighborhood cleanup campaigns; health, nutrition and hygiene workshops in poor 
neighborhoods and vaccination campaigns against communicable diseases. In all, 
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according to John Booth, by 1983 "service development and neighborhood improvement 
programs for poor urban neighborhoods had improved the living conditions for an 
estimated two hundred and fifty thousand people.112 
Regardless of government efforts to improve the standard of living for the poor, 
the "Contra War" crippled the advancement of these programs. The government's budget 
and resources were limited in fully carrying out, the continuation of many public services 
fully. In spite of these obstacles the Sandinista government had, by 1984, accomplished 
their goal to redistribute some of the wealth that had been strongly concentrated in the 
hands of the Somoza family to the majority of the poor in Nicaragua.113 
The Contra War 
The Ronald Reagan administration viewed the Sandinista government as a threat 
to their hegemony in the Western hemisphere. The Sandinista's revolution was 
especially threatening since this was a period of time during which the Cold War was at it 
height. Fear that the Soviet Union would continue to influence Communist ideas in 
Nicaragua was the first reason the U.S gave for intervention. Former National Security 
adviser, Robert McFarlane, suggested that "the influence of communism in Nicaragua is 
strong and as a result it is necessary to apply the Reagan Doctrine. Nicaragua is in the 
backyard of U.S. territory, meaning that an enemy influence like the Soviet Union in this 
region will interfere with U.S ability to be in control and to dictate events elsewhere in 
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the Third World."114 The United States felt that the fact that Nicaragua was in its 
backyard made it more urgent for them to promote removal of the Sandinista 
government. 
Once the United States intervened in Nicaragua there was worldwide criticism of 
its violation of international laws. The constant criticism of the war encouraged the 
Democrat -controlled House of Representative to call for a stop of U.S aid of the war. 
However, this did not stop the Reagan administration from continuing its mission of 
removing the Sandinistas. Oliver North, a White House emissary was sent out to 
Honduras to communicate to the FDN leaders that the president Reagan was still 
determined to remove the Sandinista government from power.115 
The "Contra War," aside from being illegal, made it significantly difficult for the 
Sandinista government to prosper. The social programs that were developed to help better 
the standard of living of the Nicaraguan people were jeopardized by the war. The war 
took away the vision of the revolution. Instead, the Sandinistas had to invest in a war that 
decreased progress for the Nicaraguan society. Furthermore, the Sandinistas restricted 
civil liberties and political rights, leading to a decrease in support from the Nicaraguan 
people. 
The end of the cold war triggered the U.S to stop its support to the "Contras." This 
paved the way for elections and a victory towards democracy. The election of a new 




Nevertheless, the results of the 1990 elections took the Sandinista party by 
surprise, as they had felt sure of their victory. President Ortega was aware that the main 
concern of the Nicaraguan people was to end the Contra War and the U.S embargo that 
was holding back Nicaragua's ability to grow economically and democratically. Ortega 
admits that the main reason for his defeat was the lack of assurance to the majority of 
Nicaraguans that the war would end if they won the elections. He also pointed out that 
Nicaraguans felt that United States would only come to peace if Violeta Chamorro were 
elected. Ortega argued that the U.S officials were not going to change their policies 
toward Nicaragua even if his party had won the elections fairly.116 
Violeta Chamorro, with 55 percent of the votes, did unseat Ortega. Chamorro was 
the widow of Pedro Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, the opposition Newspaper against the 
Somoza government, making her a great candidate for the opposition party Union 
Nacional Opositora (UNO). The anti-Sandinista coalition, UNO, was created with the 
following parties: Conservatives, Independent Liberals, Social Christians, Social 
Democrats, Socialist and Communist. Despite tense moments the transition was 
ultimately peaceful. 
Chamorro's victory indicated to the world that Nicaragua was transforming into a 
new era. Nicaragua was at another point of change, manifested through a second 
democratic election and movement way from a socialist to a conservative democratic 
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government.117 Chamorro's vision was "both conservative and democratic,"11 by 
increasing civil liberties and creating free market policies meant to build the Nicaraguan 
economy. The Nicaraguan people believed that Chamorro would be able to bring 
prosperity and economic growth and build a strong democratic state. The United States 
ended the embargo and aid to the Contras right after Chamorro took office,119 Chamorro 
assumed power by the end of April, promising the Nicaraguan people a 100-day 
immediate recovery plan for the economy that would be accomplished through major 
support and assistance from the U.S. The 100-day recovery plan resulted in the 
abolishment of many of the social programs that the Sandinistas had accomplished over 
the eleven years. Her "presidential decrees sought to return businesses and land 
confiscated by the revolutionary government to their previous owners. Classic neoliberal 
economic policies sought to dismiss thousands of government workers and privatize 
state-owed businesses."120 Under Chamorro the social programs that the Sandinistas 
created, such as health care, education and literacy programs, suffered budget cuts. In 
reality, the years of instability during the Contra War weakened the Sandinistas' public 
support and the Nicaraguan people wanted change. Nicaraguans voted for Chamorro 
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because they wanted to transition from a socialist government that had influenced conflict 
and war into a market economy that would bring economic growth. However, this new 
market economy led to the loss of many Sandinista social programs and an increase in 
class inequalities. Chamorro was able to assure better civil liberties, but her neoliberal 
economics failed to protect the poor. Party division between liberals, conservatives and 
Sandinismo re -emerged. The struggle for political domination continues among these 
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parties. 
The 1990 election was a vital point for Nicaraguan citizens taking charge in 
electing the next government. The Nicaraguan people were following closely what each 
candidate had to offer, making sure that they chose the right candidate suitable for 
Nicaragua. Chamorro was successful at bringing together a coalition of parties that 
offered the Nicaragua economy a new path and citizens a change of regime, aside from 
the fact that most of her neoliberal economics did not effectively protect those social 
programs that the Sandinista era had attempted. The Contra War, along with the United 
States embargo, had reduced the Sandinista's public support. Still, by the end of 
Chamorro government many Nicaraguans wanted some type of safety net reminiscent of 
the Sandinista program. 
The Sandinistas entered the 1996 campaign divided, creating the new 
Renovisionist Sandinista movement (MRS). Ortega tried to reinvent his image to the 
Nicaraguan people, but the years of war and embargo haunted his new campaign. The 
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Liberal Alliance had a new face, Arnoldo Aleman, who previously was the mayor of 
Managua. His campaign promoted both a "free market and a social safety net,"123 that 
most Nicaraguans believed would strengthen Nicaragua economically and 
democratically. Once Aleman won the 1996 elections his government was clearly more 
devoted toward the rich than Chamorro had been, and promises made during his 
campaign were unfulfilled. Aleman's main recognition during his years as president was 
his greed for power. His policies and attitude slowed Nicaragua's ability to prosper 
democratically even more. His market economy allowed the rich to accumulate more 
wealth while increasing inequalities among the poor.124 His government was filled with 
corruption "he disregarded many aspects of fiscal law and encouraged his Liberal Party 
supporters in the National Assembly and elsewhere to do the same."125 
After six years of corruption under the Aleman government Nicaraguans were 
again ready for change. In the 2001 elections, the new face for the Liberal Party was 
Enrique Bolanos, former vice president of Aleman. During his campaign he sought to 
distant himself from Aleman's dishonest government. Chamorro was a strong supporter 
of Bolanos. She assured the Nicaraguan people that better days would come, to be 
patient, and that Bolanos would continue the work and changes she made during her 
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government.126 Bolanos campaigned against his strongest opponent, Ortega. This time 
Ortega tried to change his appearance by wearing casual civilian clothes instead of his red 
and black Sandinistas colors. He also emphasized the poverty that still existed and the 
priority his government would place in providing a better standard of living for the 
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poor. 
However, Bolanos won the 2001 elections and upon his inauguration he stood by 
his promise to the Nicaraguan people to respect the rule of law by calling on legislation to 
remove Aleman from his self-imposed immunity. Bolanos joined the National Assembly 
along with Sandinista activists to remove Aleman's immunity. The legislators finally 
voted to remove Aleman's immunity; he was sentenced to prison for corruption charges 
and for the immunity he had attempted to set up for himself.128 
Nicaragua's Current Government 
The 2006 election brought Ortega back to power. Ortega has a unique approach to 
the issues the country faces; according to news reports he has spent a great deal of time 
trying to fix and change things to his favor so that he can remain in power.129 He has also 
allied himself with Arnoldo Aleman, the former president convicted of corruption and 
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of the Liberal Party is speculated to have formed a political pact with Ortega. "El pacto," 
in which the two former enemies conspired to change the constitution to give the 
Sandinistas "almost an equal number of seats on the supreme Court, the Comptroller's 
Office and in the Federal Electoral Council."130 Ever since the allegations began, 
Aleman's sentence has been cut from 20 years to five and his house arrest now allows 
him to travel throughout the country. Ortega's adviser on Social Affairs defends his 
alliance with Aleman, arguing that it was done for "the sake of building an anti-oligarchic 
front. According to this theory, Aleman and the Somozas represented an emergent 
capitalist class that took on the old oligarchy, which has dominated Nicaraguan politics 
and the economy since the 19th century."1 
According to an analyst of the Heritage Foundation Ortega is 
caught between conflicting priorities: a mix of economic policies that would boost 
investor confidence and be good for Nicaragua's versus his goals of consolidating power and 
building a socialist State. While working with private capitalist and foreign investors in the 
background, he has been condemning the "Savage capitalist" and has kicked off a traditional 
campaign to buy votes among the poor with handout promises of "a cow, a pig, poultry and seeds 
to 75,000 rural families.132 
Since Ortega became re-elected he has promised the poor in Nicaragua "Free 
education, health care and medicine" as it was available during the Sandinista 
administration in the 1980's. In Ortega's "2008 budget, announced in October 2007, he 
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did dramatically increase funding for education and health care, but at the expense of a 
large deficit. The government has not yet explained how it will cover the deficit and 
could be tempted to suspend debt services and default on Nicaragua's external debt" 
As reported by the Economist in 2007, Ortega has "fired four ministers and a 
number of junior officials for speaking out of turn, all in just a short nine months of 
office."134 Critics have charged that Daniel Ortega has been more worried about his 
friendship with Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez than the issues Nicaragua is facing. 
Chavez has offered Ortega "power plants, tractors and factories. These will be financed 
by soft loans from Venezuelan state banks, according to Miguel Gomez, the Venezuelan 
ambassador in Managua."135 Chavez has pledged to build a pipeline across Nicaragua to 
the Pacific to carry Venezuela crude oil for shipment to refineries in China and Japan, but 
to date this has not materialized. 
Ortega's government has promised the Nicaraguan people it will continue the 
vision of the first revolutionary government. He initiated an innovative number of social 
programs with populist titles such as "zero hunger," "Houses for the people," and "zero 
unemployment."137 He implemented a literacy campaign with the objective of lowering 
" Ortega's Crab dance." The Economist. 13 October 2007, 41. 
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the illiteracy rate that had grown to a 35 percent in 2007, as a continuation of the literacy 
crusade of the 1980s.138 Ortega has accomplished "important progress in energy 
production and road construction, while social programs providing loans for women, 
handouts to farmers, and drinking water, and land titles to the rural poor."139 Most of this 
support can be credited to Chavez who gave the Ortega government 457 million in aid in 
2008, according to data from the Central Bank.140 
Ortega has also welcomed assistance from Iran's President, Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad, who has offered 350 million dollars for a new port. Ortega met up with 
Iranian Deputy Energy Minister Hamid Chitchian to help construct several hydroelectric 
plants to help solve the energy crisis in Nicaragua. So far Iran has committed itself to 
help build just one plant. Nicaragua continues to deal with blackouts almost daily, so this 
plant is crucial in beginning to solve a major problem.141 The Ortega government has 
received harsh criticism from opposition parties for his friendship with former president 
Aleman and his lack of effort in making sure Nicaragua progresses economically. Despite 
the criticism, the Nicaraguan government continues to receive credit for moving forward 








Since the 1990s' elections to the present, Nicaragua has sought to build a strong 
democracy. The Chamorro government marked the end of a socialist era and the 
beginning of a new regime. With the Liberal Party control for the past 16 years this 
symbolizes progress towards democracy. Nicaragua's people have been able to 
participate and vote for the government of their choice, triumphing over the years of 
Somoza authoritarianism. Democracy has finally been accomplished, though poverty still 
remains as part of the lives of most Nicaraguans. Nicaragua continues to search for a 
government that will meet the needs of the majority of Nicaraguans and alleviate the 
economic problems the country faces. 























The table above offers a summary of the time periods and regime types that 
constitute an historical overview of Nicaragua over the past 70 years. The Somoza 
regime, labeled as a dictatorship, lasted 43 years and was filled with widespread human 
rights violations. Somoza ruled and controlled Nicaragua through the National Guard, 
which constituted the core of his Dynasty. During the Sandinista era from 1979-1990 
there were attempts to have elections but the opposition did not participate. Once the 
Contra War began they were faced with violation of civil liberties and political rights. 
The revolution best describes this era since it marks the transition period between the end 
of the Somoza dynasty and it takes place during a time that Nicaragua was at war. The 
Violeta Chamorro era indicates the start of a new regime in which Nicaraguans were able 
to vote under a democracy. 
CHAPTER IV 
Analysis of Nicaragua growth and the effect of Democracy since 1990's 
Nicaragua's economic growth is going to be analyzed at the micro and macro levels. 
This study will be divided into two sections: a macro level analysis based on World Bank 
Development Indicators, and a micro level analysis based upon survey data from the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project. The analysis will determine whether macro and 
micro level measures of economic development are influenced by democratic 
governance. 
The independent variable democracy is going to be defined as "the principle of 
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consent of the governed. The term implies that the people of a country or territory are 
sovereign and consent, in a direct referendum or through elected representatives, to the 
establishment of their own government."142 Table 2 categorizes political development in 
Nicaragua, noting the timeframe of the current democratic government. 
To measure the dependent variable, this analysis relies upon multiple indicators. The 
analysis will include measures of poverty. Poverty will be defined as a deprivation of 
fundamental human needs such as the right to, health care, education, and access to clean 
water, protection and shelter. To better understand how democracy affects the poor at 
domestic level, poverty will be measured through economic measures that exclude social 
welfare issues such as gender and equality. To further understand whether or not 
democracy translate into growth, changes in the poverty rate will be measured through 
indicators such as life expectancy at birth, improved water resources available to the 
population and mortality rate under age five. Additionally, the primary education 
completion rate will be examined. These are the social indicators most frequently used by 
politicians and international organizations to determine the growth of a nation at a 
domestic level. It is important to keep in mind there is missing data in some time periods 
since it is a fact that instability and poverty tend to undermine data collection. 
In addition to poverty, the analysis will also include measures of economic growth and 
wealth. Nicaragua's economic growth will be measured through the GNP per capita and 
electric power consumption. These two economic indicators will provide insight into 
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Nicaragua's growth and industralization. Democracy is going to be measured through the 
GNP per capita since its best suited to analyze the level of growth Nicaragua has attained 
since it became a democratic nation. The GNP per capita measures Nicaragua's growth 
at a national level this does not capture the levels of poverty that persist in Nicaragua 
domestically. 
Both the economic and social indicators will demonstrate that a level of growth in 
prosperity and well-being has occurred in Nicaragua beginning even in a part of the 
Somoza era in 1960 and continuing through the revolution and four elections up to 2006. 
The only national economic indicator presented here for the Somoza Era is evidence of 
electric consumption in Nicaragua. Electric power consumption, starting from 1970, 
shows a slight increase, which quickly decreases, in the early 1970's. However, by mid-
1970 the Somoza government era shows a high level of performance in electric 
consumption, with the increase continuing up to the end of the regime. 
At the beginning of the Sandinista era 1980, electric consumption decreases but then 
shows some growth by mid 1980's, once again decreasing by the end of their term. Also 
in the Chamorro term, there is a good start in the electric consumption that decreases by 
mid 1990's. By 1996, as Aleman's government begins, there is an increase in electric 
consumption with only a slight decrease in late 1990 and quickly again, growth into the 
2000's. Bolanos government shows a continuation of the increase in electric consumption 
and this carries over into the new Sandinista era in 2006. It is interesting to note that the 
highest level of electric consumption were reached in the mid-1970's were lost and not 
regained until mid- 2000's. 
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The data collected for the electric power consumption shows that slowly 
Nicaragua is heading towards becoming a more industrialized country. The data 
demonstrate a slight growth in energy consumption in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
remaining neutral during the early 1990's and increasing into the late 1990s. The 1990s 
mark the beginning of a new regime with Violeta Chamorro's presidency. During her 
term, energy consumption is at the lowest, declining for most of her term. By the late 
1990s, energy consumption starts to increase. In the 2000's energy consumption is at its 
highest and continues to grow in the mid 2000's, showing progress for Nicaragua. 
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The GNI per capita excludes the Somoza government due to a lack of data. At the 
initiation of the Sandinista government in the 1980's, the graph shows a slight increase 
that continues into early 1980's with a small decline by mid 1980's but continuing its 
increase into late 1980's. Then, drastic decreases appear in the late 1980's near the end of 
their term. Chamorro's government experienced the lowest level of GNI per capita. Her 
government started with a small increase in 1990 that drastically declined during her term 
though somewhat increasing by mid 1990's. During Aleman's government the GNI per 
capita continued its increase till the end of his term. Followed by Bolanos government the 
GNI per capita showed a constant increase that remained up to the beginning of the 
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In the early 1990s there is a drastic decline in GNI per capita which then slowly 
shows increase into the 1990s. And in the early 2000's, a drastic increase appears which 
continues into the mid- 2000's. Under a democratic system, Nicaragua has experienced 
growth and industralization as the GNI per capita and the electric power comsumption 
rates have shown. The question remains: Have these factors led to tangible improvements 
in people's lives? Has there been poverty reduction, or a reduction in the social problems 
linked to poverty?The following four social indicators: life expectancy at birth, mortality 
rate, primary school completion rate and improved water source will be used to analyze 
the impact of these indicators in relation to the reduction of poverty in nicaragua. Such 
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social and economic indicators are commonly used to determine the level of poverty and 
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The social indicator, life expectancy at birth, gives strong evidence that health 
care assistance has drastically improved in Nicaragua since the 1960's. The line shown 
above illustrates a steady growth in life expectancy at birth. Since then, up to late in the 
first decade of the 21st century, the line continues up, showing a 20% increase over the 
40-year period and indicating that progress continues. 
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The primary school completion rate shows a steady growth in 1970's during the 
Somoza government transition into the Sandinista era. Very early in the 1980's the 
Sandinista government accomplished an increase in primary school completion, which 
decreased by mid- 1980's and then continued to increase again in the early 1990's. The 
Chamorro government continued the trend of increased in primary school completion and 
Aleman's government maintained this increase. Though at the beginning of Bolanos 
government there is a slight decrease, an immediate but brief increase in early 2000, 
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decreasing once again within a short time frame and remaining the same for most of his 
presidential term. Under the current government and second Ortega administration, an 
increase in primary school completion rate occurs and remains steady. Thus, primary 
school completion rates are at their lowest in the early 1990's with some increase by mid 
1990's but with much missing data for about five years. With increases again in 2000, 
mostly maintained up to the current date, it is fair to draw the conclusion that most 
Nicaraguan are now able to have at least some degree of basic education compared to all 
of the earlier years. 
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In 1970, during the Somoza era, the infant mortality rate starts to slowly decrease 
from its rather high rate, continuing a slow decline up to the end the regime in 1979. 
During the early Sandinista years the decrease in mortality rates consistently continues up 
to the end of their government rule in 1990 despite the missing data. Mortality rates 
remain low throughout the Chamorro, ALeman and Bolanos government eras. During the 
earliest years of the second Ortega government, the decrease in mortality rate continues. 
Thus, mortality rates have decreased consistently and significantly over the entire 
40-year period indicating a consistent and probable significant improvement in health 
care and physical well-being for the average Nicaraguan. More Nicaraguans are able to 
get better medical attention for children under age five. 
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Despite missing data examined in this paper, improvements in water resources appear 
to have been consistently rising in Nicaragua. An improved water source is an important 
social indicator in the reduction of poverty and ill health and thus is an important 
reflection of growth in national well being. The data above indicate that the Nicaraguan 
population has much greater access to improved water resources, indicating notable 
progress toward the reduction of poverty. 
The social and economic indicators listed show that the living standards for the poor 
are improving but still in progress. This hypothesis testing provides insight regarding 
areas of progress made since Nicaragua became a democratic nation in the 1990s. The 
GNI per capita and the electric power consumption provides some evidence that 
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Nicaragua is working towards becoming a more industrialized country in spite of 
showing some set backs in the early 1990s. We still observe some progress in the late 
2000s leaving hope for more improvement in the years to come. Primary school 
completion rates are significantly higher indicating that most Nicaraguans are at least 
able to have some degree of education now compared to the years under dictatorship. We 
can observe this improvement in education beginning with the Sandinista literacy 
campaign. The Sandinista literacy campaign set the stage for a more educated Nicaraguan 
population that continued under democracy. In the mortality rates and life expectancy at 
birth we observe a great amount of progress in health care and assistance for the average 
Nicaraguan. The Nicaraguan population has improved water resources as well. All of the 
social indicators reported here give strong indication that Nicaragua, since it became a 
democratic nation, has increased the standard of living for the average. It appears these 
changes will continue with the extension of democratic institutions in Nicaragua. 
Analysis of Nicaragua 
LAPOP surveys 1991 and2008 (individual responses) 
To complement this analysis of macro indicator, this study also examines how 
Nicaraguans view their welfare. Using the LAPOP survey data gathered during the year 
of 1991 and the year 2008, this section will examine individual responses on the level of 
satisfaction Nicaraguans have with their lives. These individual responses will only 
include urban respondents as the 1991 survey was only conducted in urban areas. The 
LAPOP survey since the 1970s has collected survey data in Latin America on a variety of 
political topics, such as support for the democratic system, citizen confidence, assessment 
and participation in the political system both nationally and locally, as well as measuring 
63 
the levels of corruption and victimization that affect the impact of democracy and 
economic growth. 143 
Previous economic and social indicators were able to offer a glimpse at the 
national level of progress, but these do not show how citizens view these changes. These 
micro data will assess citizens owns personal opinions, as well as examine their personal 
economic situation through their possessions or consumer goods. The following chart and 
graphs will demonstrate the percentage of possession and consumer goods. They will also 
answer an important question How satisfied are Nicaraguans with their lives?144 
143
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The charts above analyze individual responses comparing 1991 and 2008 material 
well being (income, goods, access to services) from the LAPOP surveys as well as 
individual perceptions of prosperity to determine how satisfied Nicaraguans are with their 
lives in 1991 and 2008 using the same LAPOP surveys. The individual response survey 
shows that material well being for the Nicaraguans surveyed have improved. Between 
1991 and 2008, the main changes we recognize are the "access to a vehicle" suggesting 
that fewer Nicaraguan's have access to a vehicle compared to 1990's. The differences in 
the individual responses of 1991 are significantly different from those of 2008, aside 
from vehicle access. This indicates that the ability to access certain indicators of material 
well-being is, for the average Nicaraguan, improving since Nicaragua became a 
democratic state. 
Despite the fact that most Nicaraguans are better able to have access to certain 
consumer goods, which are important, factors in measuring a economic prosperity, this 
measure of growth does not capture the level of access to public services that could 
reduce poverty, such as access to public libraries, parks and recreations, transportation, 
property protection, welfare and social security. These latter items are difficult to 
measure, as surveys in 1991 did not include items measuring citizen access to such 
goods. Still, this could be a valuable venue for future field research, if documentation of 
government expenditures in these areas were to become readily available. 
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Based on the survey that asked, how satisfied are you with your life? Between 
1991 and 2008 Nicaraguans continue to be satisfied with their lives. While more people 
seem to be somewhat unsatisfied with their lives in 2008, still the number of those 
satisfied with their lives has increased in comparison to 1990's respondents. Also, fewer 
Nicaraguans are unsatisfied with their lives than those in 1990s. What is evident is that 
despite the poverty that continues to prevail in Nicaragua, most Nicaraguans seemed to 
be satisfied or somewhat satisfied with their lives. 
While Nicaragua has made some gains at the micro and macro levels, it is 
important to note that corruption has been a persistent problem, which could wipe out the 
gains made under democracy. As the figure below indicates, corruption has been an 
ongoing problem in Nicaragua under democracy, peaking in the late 1990's and rising 




Does democracy help the poor? 
Democracy Helps 
• Doh Chull Shi argues, "Citizens of democratic 
states experience a far better quality of life than 
those in non-democracies."145 
• David Brown and Wendy Hunter add, 
"Democratic regimes are associated with higher 
rates of social expenditures when faced with 
important economic constraints."146 
• Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia report, 
"Fewer children die in democracies than in 
dictatorships."147 
• Hiskey concludes, "The demand-based approach 
to fighting poverty is greatly enhanced by a 
democratic local political environment." 48 
Democracy Hurts 
• Michael Ross "democracies spend more money on 
education and health care than non-democracies, but 
these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper 
income groups."149 
• Przeworski and Limongi suggest, "we do not know 
whether democracy fosters or hinders economic 
growth." 
• Helliwell adds "democracy on subsequent economic 
growth, the evidence in this article pours cold 
water on the notion that introducing democracy is 
likely to accelerate subsequent growth."151 
• De Haan and Siermann suggest that, "the 
relationship between democracy and economic 
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growth is not robust."15"1 
• Erich Weede concludes ,"the overall effect of 
political democracy on economic growth is 
negative, but rather weak."153 
• Mitchell Seligson, "In Nicaragua, the study finds 
evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis 
of a link between corruption and erosion of belief 
in the legitimacy of the political system." 4 
So, does democracy help the poor? Certainly democracy is apart of the 
ingredients necessary to allow solid establishment of factors that promote social and 
political rights. In the case of Nicaragua, an examination of the question for the 30-year 
period between the Sandinista revolution and what is foreseen in 2010 requires caution 
and the naming of crucial missing ingredients. Much more than a free election is required 
for democracy to help the poor. Those running must have vision, integrity, and a clear 
plan as well as, the support of the electorate and freedom from outside influence. 
Deep shame on the part of some informed North Americans over the part played 
in derailing the Sandinista experiment would be expected but is insufficient to correct any 
current woes. On the ground in Nicaragua, the process since the end of the Contra war 
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has been, largely, a co-opting of the electoral system, a mixing of religious conservatism 
with political machinations. This has led many to wonder what the future holds for 
Nicaragua? 
What remains is a history of five elections with enough markings of fairness to 
claim them successful enough by a measure of 'democratic.' Current president Daniel 
Ortega has argued that he aims to make a new fight to change the system: to get back to 
the agenda of the people he calls for a socially responsive agenda that matches policy 
with the needs of the people. The reality is that all there is left in Nicaragua is hope for 
change. The constant battle among different political parties has seriously delayed the 
process of growth in Nicaragua. 
The question still remains: Does democracy help the poor? Various authors were 
able to offer plausible explanation as to why democracy helps or hurt the poor. Does 
democracy help in the case of Nicaragua? The analysis used in this research finds that 
democracy does help the poor in Nicaragua. What is missing, as discussed by various 
authors, is a transparent and accountable system in which the Nicaraguan public can trust. 
For democracy to prosper in a nation filled with a history of instability and conflict of 
interest among those who govern, it is crucial that we enforce what democracy preaches. 
Democracy requires direct participation and accountability from both citizens and 
government. Democracy is everyone's responsibility. Until we all assume such 
responsibility, we will continue to struggle but barely attain a stable democracy in 
Nicaragua. While some might argue that voting constitutes the core of a strong 
democracy, in the case of Nicaragua, transparent and honest elections have been held at 
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least since Violeta Chamorro took office in 1990. Still Nicaragua remains with high 
levels of corruption as shown in the CPI scores in the graph above and the poor remain 
poor. The essence of a strong democracy is the informed consent of the governed. We the 
people should be able and active in every decision made by those whom were elected to 
govern. 
From the graphs from the World Bank it can be argued that the standard of living 
for the poor in Nicaragua is improving and that democracy has brought some economic 
growth. Still the data from the LAPOP surveys in two different time periods 1991 and 
2008 show that the level of improvements does not indicate any drastic increase in 
growth of material well being. The increase in consumer possession is significant, but not 
dramatic. Poverty remains a crucial problem. On the other hand, there appears to be some 
level of satisfaction among most Nicaraguans regarding their lives. We can argue that 
democracy did help the poor by opening the door to part take in the building of a strong 
democracy in Nicaragua. Finally it can be said that despite the poverty levels that do 
prevail among Nicaraguans based on the LAPOP surveys, Nicaraguans are somewhat 
satisfied with their lives. The struggle the nation went through to remove the years of 
somozismo and many thousands of the fallen heroes who fought for a better Nicaragua 
might be justified by these levels of satisfaction. To the same extent democracy seems to 
have helped the poor, allowing those who lived under an oppressive regime for years to 
fight for a better future for Nicaragua. While poverty still remains a problem the struggle 
has allowed the poor, to begin to participate in the political process. 
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